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SUMMARY
The essence of this thesis is to explore the role of Nigeria, West Africa’s hegemon, in the
intervention efforts by the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) through its
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in both Liberia (1990-1997) and Sierra Leone
(1993-2000). While the thesis has sought to understand the leading role played by Nigeria in first
establishing the ECOWAS and being the primus motor for its functions, I have also attempted to
analyse the rationalities for the transformation of ECOWAS from a purely economic integrative
scheme to a security organisation. While the economic agendas for ECOWAS have not changed,
the argument in this thesis is that security related issues and realities have taken precedence over
the original economistic agendas. One of the thesis’ major arguments is that the nature of results
attained in both Liberia and Sierra Leone are different because of (a) the leadership role of
Nigeria and (b) the nature of international responses and contributions to the resolution of these
conflicts.
In the thesis, I argue that in the Liberian case, Nigeria took a more domineering leadership
role albeit tinged with the characteristics of the actions of a benevolent hegemon. Here, Nigeria
through different processes either through leadership, consensus-seeking processes and dialogue
managed to get other ECOWAS states to coalesce around its leadership. However, in Sierra
Leone, Nigeria’s leadership role was not permitted to unfold. The resultant effect was the shift
from NIFAG to ECOMOG and eventually %rekindling hatred& of these troops as UN troops.
This thesis has pointed to the utility of sub-regional organisations in resolving conflicts and
demonstrates the need for further study.
KEY TERMS
Peacekeeping Efforts; ECOMOG; Liberian Conflict; Sierra Leonean Conflict; Sub-regional
Security; Security Concerns; Regimes Theory; ECOWAS; Peace-enforcements; Nigerian
Intervention.
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